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ABSTRACT
Burning Budgets: Does an Institutional Blank-Check Raise the Severity and Cost of
Fighting Wildland Fires?

by

Devin T. Stein, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2017

Major Professor: Dr. Ryan Yonk
Department: Economics and Finance
This article uses a public choice perspective to analyze the institutions and
incentives that fire managers face. The theoretical framework posited here suggests that a
vicious cycle of fire suppression exists in the United States driven by an institutionalblank-check.
The “institutional-blank-check” theory is tested with regression analysis that
attempts to explain fire suppression expenditures, the cost per acre of suppression, and
the probability of a budget increase for the U.S. Forest Service in the continental United
States. The results from these tests suggest that political factors, including injuries from
wildfires and the number of politicians from a state sitting on the House of
Representatives’ Appropriations Committee, the oversight committee tasked with
managing wildfire management expenditures for the U.S. Forest Service, do play
significant roles in determining the amount spent in each state on fire suppression.
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These results suggest that political institutions are decisive in determining how
much is spent on suppressing wildfires in the United States. Reforming these institutions
could be a key component in improving wildfire and forest management in the United
States.
(42 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Burning Budgets: Does an Institutional Blank-Check Raise the Severity and Cost of
Fighting Wildland Fires?
Devin T. Stein

In conducting this research, I wanted to explore whether political incentives have
a significant effect on wildfire management in the United States. I attempt to answer this
question by proving a theoretical justification for why wildfires may become more
expensive to fight and severe to manage because of political institutions. I then attempt to
provide some hard evidence to support this theory by using regression analysis. My
analysis suggests that political factors do matter for wildfire suppression funding,
although I was unable to find strong enough evidence to suggest that these political
factors are actually driving more severe wildfires.
This research contributes to the literature on public choice theory, a branch of
political economy that looks at government from the individual decision makers’ level.
Additionally, this research contributes to the literature on what affects wildfire
suppression effectiveness and funding. This research may contribute to future analyses of
the institutions that make U.S. wildland firefighters more or less capable of effectively
managing wildfires to protect human lives, property, and forests.
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INTRODUCTION

On October 25, 2003, a fire erupted in San Diego County, California, that
destroyed nearly 3,000 buildings and spread at up to 40,000 acres per hour (Lakeside
Historical Society, n.d.). The conflagration killed more than a dozen people and injured
more than 100 others, which attracted substantial political and media attention. United
States House Representative Duncan Hunter’s home was threatened by the fire (it
eventually would burn), and he called Ray Quintanar, a regional aviation chief for the
U.S. Forest Service, demanding that aircraft be dispatched to attack the fire. Quintanar
refused because high winds and poor visibility would make use of the aircraft ineffective.
But after Hunter called the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., six
C-130 Hercules transports were sent to fight the fire (Cart and Boxall, 2008).
Quintanar believed that those planes did very little to control the fire, but he
characterized the response as a “political air show,” or a “CNN drop.” Such political air
shows are described by the Los Angeles Times as “the high-profile use of expensive
aircraft to appease elected officials” (Cart and Boxall, 2008). Despite their
ineffectiveness, aerial drops make good television coverage of wildfire responses, which
shows the public that their elected leaders are taking immediate and drastic steps to
ensure their safety.
This story illustrates the political forces that underlie fire suppression in the
United States. Although fire experts generally understand effective wildfire management
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strategies, politics often gets in the way. When centralized political forces with no
wildfire management experience have greater control of wildfire suppression strategies
than the experts, it is unsurprising that larger fire-suppression budgets are not reducing
the severity of U.S. wildfires (Brusentsev and Vroman, 2016). This article explores the
political factors and institutions that may be reducing the efficiency of managing
wildfires.
The technologies and tactics used for wildfire management are improving
continually, yet there is no clear evidence that these agencies are getting better results
(Ingalsbee, 2010). The annual number of acres burned in wildfires has grown
significantly in past decades, and federal fire-suppression expenditures are skyrocketing
(Brusentsev and Vroman, 2016). Widespread debate about the causes points generally to
past suppression efforts, drought conditions, climate change, and economic development
in the wildland-urban interface (Gebert and Black, 2012).
I suggest another cause for more acres burned and larger wildfire suppression
costs: an institutional weakness in current fire suppression policy. Although the existing
literature looks at individual fire manager behavior and the perverse incentives faced, as
well as risk management and decision making under uncertainty, no studies yet have tried
to bring an institutional analysis of political processes to bear in explaining fire outcomes.
This study will not look at traditional causes of greater wildfire severity and higher costs,
but rather suggest that political institutions may be a driving factor.
More expensive and severe wildfires in the United States are an important policy
issue because wildfires can damage communities, timber resources, human lives, wildlife,
as well as impact soil conditions, watersheds, and water quality. The existing literature
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generally attributes the increase in wildfires to past fire suppression efforts and climate
change. This paper uses public choice analysis to suggest an alternative hypothesis: that
wildfires are becoming more severe in the United States because of political incentives
that raise fire-suppression spending. The theory is supported by a series of statistical tests
that suggest that political factors do have a significant effect on wildfire suppression
expenditures.
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BACKGROUND

In 1908, Congress passed the Forest Fires Emergency Act, which allowed the
newly created U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to exceed its appropriated budget (i.e., run a
deficit) on fire suppression to prevent forest fires from destroying the timber reserves the
agency was supposed to protect. Because fires were uncontrollable at the time, budget
constraints were considered unthinkable, and a blank-check policy ensured that the USFS
would be able to fund fire suppression efforts.
During the early days of the USFS, wildfires were so dangerous that they were
viewed as a war on the home front. Any suggestion of actively managing fires using
practices like light-burning were considered heresy because these fires would threaten
more lives (Pyne, 1996). For the next several decades, wildfire suppression had almost
unanimous congressional and public support.
It was not until the 1970s that forest ecologists reached a consensus that many
North American forests were fire-adapted ecosystems that actually needed periodic
burning. In 1978, Congress repealed the Forest Fires Emergency Act, forcing the USFS
to manage fires more holistically and economically. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the
USFS managed fires cost-effectively, borrowing funding from the agency’s reforestation
budget for bad fire years and replenishing it on their own in good years (Berry, 2007).
Perhaps not surprisingly, those were the years with the fewest number of acres burned in
wildfires, as shown in Figure 1, although the period also was wetter than average.
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Source: National Interagency Coordination Center.

Figure 1. Acres Burned by Wildfires, 1960-2015.
Then, in 1988, conditions were drier than normal and Yellowstone National Park
was experimenting with “let-burn” policies that allowed most naturally caused fires to
spread without human control. A series of wildfires erupted, burning more than a third of
the park over the course of one summer. As the world’s first national park, the
Yellowstone fires attracted substantial media attention. The National Park Service,
coordinating with the USFS, severely overspent on fire suppression trying to protect
Yellowstone. In 1990, following a year of post-fire review, Congress reimbursed the
USFS for its suppression expenditures, demonstrating that fire suppression was so
politically popular that budget constraints were irrelevant (Berry, 2007). Although formal
institutions designed to set budget constraints are in place, the Yellowstone fires may
have created an informal regime of congressional acceptance of overspending on
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suppression. Because politicians are unlikely to refuse something as politically popular as
more funding for fire suppression, USFS officials apparently discovered a reliable way of
obtaining additional funding for their objective of managing fires. Thus, the Yellowstone
fires may have marked the birth of the institutional blank-check mindset.
As of 2015, more than half of the USFS’s budget and workforce is dedicated to
fire management (U.S. Forest Service, 2015). The USFS regularly draws from an
emergency fund when the costs of suppressing a fire exceed the appropriated sum, and
Congress consistently reimburses these expenditures (Hoover and Bracmort, 2015).
Although the USFS allows many wildland fires to burn in the backcountry, any fire that
risks damage to public lives or property is suppressed regardless of cost. Some estimates
suggest that from 50 to 95 percent of firefighting costs are spent exclusively to protect
private property (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2006). This may seem to be laudable
use of federal funding, but a 2003 Office of Management and Budget report found that in
some areas it would be cheaper to let structures burn and pay the full cost of rebuilding
(Office of Management and Budget, 2003).
Wildfires nowadays are easy ways for the USFS to expand its budget and
bureaucratic purview by creating “political shows” of fire suppression. Even when local
fire managers know that efforts to suppress a fire will not work, the fight continues. Not
only is some wildfire suppression effectively useless, it also promotes moral hazard by
encouraging development in areas that are at risk from wildfires.
Focusing on suppression exclusively takes resources away from proactive
management strategies that are more likely to reduce long-term fire risks. Some 230
million acres of Forest Service and Department of Interior lands need to be treated for
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their excessive fuel loads. Less than three million acres actually are treated each year,
which is insufficient to reduce long-term risk (Gorte, 2013). Although proactive wildfire
management is more cost-effective in the long-run, federal fire management agencies
have an incentive to fight rather than to manage wildfires.
Gregory Aplet, Senior Science Director for the Wilderness Society, claims that
although federal fire management policy strongly supports proactive management,
environmental policy “allows for good decisions to be made, but does not require those
decisions to be made” (Aplet, 2006). Aplet (2006) claims that attitudinal, institutional,
and political disincentives block the adoption of “Wildland Fire Use”, a form of proactive
fire management. Those disincentives include risk aversion, suppression bias, regulatory
burdens, and political opposition from both the public and commercial interests.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

The “institutional blank-check” theory proposed here seeks to address the
question: Do political institutions drive more severe and expensive wildfires?

I have two hypotheses:

H1: An institutional blank-check for fire-suppression spending supplies incentives for fire
managers to exceed their appropriated budgets and then be reimbursed by Congress.

H2: The institutional blank-check contributes to more money being spent on fire
suppression and more acres being burned by wildfires.

I hypothesize that an institutional blank-check for the U.S. Forest Service, which
as the primary wildfire management agency, is reducing the efficiency of fighting
wildfires. For the purpose of this study, I measure the efficiency of fighting wildfires in
the inflation-adjusted cost per acre of wildfire suppression. This measure of efficiency is
oversimplified, however, because spending nothing on fire suppression for ten years
would appear to be a massive increase in efficiency, but would not actually address the
problem of actively managing wildfires. For the tests used here, however, this measure is
perfectly acceptable because of spending nothing on fire suppression is highly unlikely.
Given the political demand, the federal government will continue to spend heavily on fire
suppression, so minimizing the cost per acre is a reasonable measure of efficiency.
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Future studies might focus on adopting a better, alternative measure of wildfire
suppression efficiency by looking at the long-term minimization of property damage,
lives lost, money spent, fuel buildup, and acres burned by wildfires, while simultaneously
maximizing resource benefits. 1 Data limitations prevent me from using a better measure
of efficiency, but even with a simplified measurement this study contributes a new theory
to the literature that can be tested in future work on wildfires.
The foregoing hypothesis suggests that, while wildfires are getting more severe
and expensive, both changes may be driven by bureaucratic and political inefficiencies
rather than just ecological or climatic factors. A larger suppression budget does not
necessarily mean that fires are being fought more efficiently. The marginal effect of each
additional dollar spent on suppression is subject to diminishing marginal returns. If that is
the case, some optimal wildfire suppression budget could be computed.
The theoretical justification for the foregoing hypothesis is illustrated as a vicious
cycle in Figure 2. Because fire suppression is in high demand politically, especially in
states with lots of private and public development in at-risk areas, Members of Congress
are likely to increase funding for fire suppression, regardless of the results of that
additional spending. Such a funding mechanism creates an incentive for bureaucrats to
focus more on suppression than wildfire prevention because they can maximize agency
budgets while minimizing risks to themselves personally. Over time, a focus on
suppression leads to more fuel buildup and more severe wildfires, which drives more

1

A more robust measure that considers many of these factors is the cost plus net-value change model (C +
NVC). Owing to data limitations, however, this measurement will not be used. See Lankoande and Yoder
(2006), Donovan, Prestemon and Gebert (2011), Clark et al., (2016) and Ellison, Moseley & Bixler (2015).
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political demands for suppression. The cycle restarts, and fires increasingly become more
expensive and severe.

Less Focus on
Wildfire Prevention
Suppression budgets take
money from prevention
budgets out of “emergency”
need.

Political Demand for Wildfire
Suppression
Large wildfires drive a political
demand for protection of life
and property.

Figure 2. The Institutional Blank-Check.

More Severe Wildfires
Fuel buildup leads to more
severe wildfires, creating a
culture of “political shows” in
firefighting.
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EXISTING LITERATURE

Existing research suggests that investing in wildfire suppression is less effective
than investing in pre-suppression efforts to reduce the value of wildfire losses
(Lankoande and Yoder, 2006). Pre-suppression funding, however, often is not allocated
on the basis of highest priority needs (Anderson and Anderson, 2012). Similarly, Garrett
and Sobel (2003) looked at FEMA disaster payments and found that disaster relief is
frequently allocated politically, rather than according to need. Existing studies of
suppression and pre-suppression public spending raise concerns about the institutions that
may be fueling the recent increases in wildfire severity and the cost of suppressing those
wildfires (U.S. Forest Service, 2015). These institutions may be leading the Forest
Service to spend more on fire suppression without regard for the monies’ actual
effectiveness (O’Toole, 2007).
Stephen Pyne’s (1982) work on the history of wildfires in America helps set the
context for understanding fire regimes and human-wildfire interactions. Pyne suggests
that wildfires once were seen as creating important benefits for humans around the world,
but they are now seen widely as threats that the U.S. Forest Service, amongst other
groups, is tasked with controlling. In the United States, using wildfires for resource
benefits actively is being discouraged, despite the recognition that fire is a critical
component of many forest ecosystems (van Wagtendonk, 2007). Even Gifford Pinchot,
first Chief Forester of the U.S. Forest Service, recognized the role fires had in shaping
many North American ecosystems, but still claimed “these facts do not imply any
desirability in the fires which are now devastating the West” (Pinchot, 1899).
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This article explores questions raised by the literature on wildfires using public
choice theory, a field of political economy that uses economic analysis to study political
behavior (Shughart, 2008). Public choice theory relies on “methodological
individualism,” which adopts individuals rather than groups as the unit of analysis
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Political actors, whether elected representatives in
Congress, appointed officials, bureaucrats, or voters, are not necessarily benevolent
people pursuing the public good, but rather self-interested people pursuing more
parochial objectives. Sometimes the self-interest is obvious, as when an elected official is
trying to stay in office or a bureaucrat is trying to advance his career or obtain a larger
budget, but sometimes political actors simply have a biased perception that their job is
important enough to disregard or downplay other considerations (Buchanan and Tullock,
1962).
Fire suppression is a noble goal, but many of the political actors involved in
shaping public policies may have a biased perception of suppression being the best or
only strategy, despite the fact that fire ecologists point to the drawbacks of focusing
exclusively on fire suppression. Political actors instead use the political process to obtain
the benefits of wildfire suppression for their constituents, while externalizing the costs of
such policies to the national taxpayer.
When those living in high-risk wildfire areas have ways of concentrating the
benefits on themselves politically, they also have comparative advantages in the political
process. Mancur Olson’s (1965) seminal work on The Logic of Collective Action suggests
that a smaller, more cohesive group, such as those living in high-fire-risk areas, can bring
more political influence to bear than a large, disorganized public. This theory suggests
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that those living in high-risk areas may be more likely to provide Members of Congress
with the political support necessary to implement suppression policies they find
favorable. Because becoming informed about these issues is costly and the mathematical
probability of changing the outcome of an election is close to zero, it is perfectly rational
for the average voter to accept the status quo in which “concentrated benefits” dominate
“diffuse costs” in the political process (Downs, 1957).
The political process creates a means for people living in high-risk wildfire areas
to receive fire suppression without bearing its full cost. By continuing to invest heavily in
wildfire suppression, fire managers are promoting more development in these high-risk
areas, known as the wildland-urban interface. The wildland-urban interface (WUI) is
where development and wildlands meet or intermingle (Stein et al., 2013). Wildfire
suppression policies thus promote moral hazard by creating an indirect subsidy for
homeowners in the WUI where they do not bear the full cost of protecting property from
wildfires (Reilly, 2015; Talberth, Berrens, McKee, and Jones, 2006). This subsidy
encourages further development in high-risk areas, which raises the cost of suppression
and the damages to lives and property in the event of a wildfire.
Although fire managers recognize the disproportionate amounts of funding going
to the WUI, they do not generally advocate for policy reform. Bureaucrats working for
the Forest Service want to maximize their discretionary budgets because a larger budget
makes it easier to do their jobs, which likewise could make the agency appear more
prestigious (Niskanen, 1971). A larger budget means more responsibility, a broader
bureaucratic jurisdiction, and a higher likelihood of a larger salary, more bonuses, or
other indirect compensation like more workers to reduce an individual’s office workload.
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Furthermore, even though bureaucrats do not face reelection pressures, they respond to
public demands to for their agency’s services as well as to please Congress. Members of
the House and Senate, especially those serving on committees overseeing the executive
branch, reward agencies that help keep them in office (Weignast, 1984).
The Forest Service’s incentive to suppress wildfires to please both the public and
Congress often leads them to overspend their budget. But when the Forest Service spends
all of its budget or overspends, Congress is likely to appropriate more money. Further,
Congress regularly appropriates more funding for wildfire management than what is
granted in the Interior Department’s appropriations bill (Hoover and Bracmort, 2015).
Members of Congress generally want to focus on supplying highly visible benefits by
suppressing wildfires when needed rather than funding background work that could
prevent another disaster (Shughart, 2006). Because of this incentive to create highly
visible fire suppression, federal fire managers tend to focus more on suppression than
proactive management practices like wildland-fire use.
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DATA AND METHODS

To examine the institutional blank-check hypothesis, a combination of statistical
tests will attempt to explain the determinants of the efficiency of suppressing wildfires.
The population of this study is 42 states for which data are available, covering years from
2009 to 2015. This study relies on data from the U.S. Forest Service for state-by-state fire
suppression costs from FY 2009 to FY 2015. Most other data are measured by year, not
fiscal year, so the observations do not necessarily coincide perfectly. All costs are
rounded to the nearest thousand dollars, and represent estimates only because the Forest
Service measures fire expenditures by national forest and region, which often cross state
boundaries (K. Carpenter, personal communication, April 6, 2016).
The number of fires and acres burned in wildland fires for each state each year are
provided by the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC), which is responsible
for coordinating wildland fire resources throughout the United States. The NICC is a
subsidiary of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC). The number of fires and acres
burned comprise all wildland fires reported by federal, state, and local agencies, as well
as private land managers for some states. Each state houses different combinations of
federal, state, and local land managers reporting fires, although the observations available
for study may reflect the type of land in each state rather than reporting differences. The
cost per acre of suppressing wildfires is the total number of acres reported to have burned
in wildland fires divided by the suppression expenditures for a given state. Those
numbers do not include prescribed burns because this study is concerned only with fire
suppression.

16
The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is adopted as a measure of the
drought conditions in each state during each year. The PDSI is calculated on the basis of
precipitation, temperature, and local soil water contents. The PDSI is a measure of how
dry an area is, which provides useful information about how susceptible a forest is to
wildfire. A larger PDSI is associated with wetter conditions, while a negative PDSI is
associated with drought conditions. All PDSI data come from the National Climatic Data
Center (NCDC), a subsidiary of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). For this study, the PDSI is a 12-month average of statewide drought conditions.
Although other regional differences affect wildfire susceptibility and severity, no
systematic over- or underestimation of drought severity in all states is thought possible.
Lightning data are taken from Vaisala, Inc., a private company under contract
with the federal government to operate the National Lightning Detection Network.
Vaisala reports the total number of lightning flashes observed in each state, which serves
as a proxy for the vulnerability of national forests to lightning strikes. Not all observed
flashes are cloud-to-ground strikes, but the number of flashes is assumed to be associated
with the total number of such strikes (R. L. Holle, personal communication, February 4,
2016). Lightning strikes are the predominant natural causes of wildfires, so these
lightning data provide valuable insights into national forests’ susceptibilities to lightninginduced wildfires.
Population estimates are downloaded from the United States Census Bureau.
Although the U.S. Census is conducted only once every ten years, the Census Bureau
maintains a population estimates program that generates population figures for each year
studied herein.
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The total number of injuries and deaths from wildland fires are estimated by the
NCDC’s Storm Events Database. If the institutional blank-check hypothesis holds,
injuries and deaths are important components in wildfire-suppression spending decisions.
States with more injuries and deaths from wildfires are likely to spend more on
suppressing wildfires in the future to protect their citizens and firefighters. Some states
consistently report no deaths or injuries, whereas others consistently report many such
casualties. Oregon reported no deaths or injuries over the study period, but California
reported 203 injuries and 10 deaths. The sources of those numbers are unclear, so the
possibility exists of systematic underreporting in some states.
The number of appropriations committee members counts the number of members
each state has on the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations. Because
the Committee on Appropriations determines funding for federal agencies’ fire
suppression, the institutional blank-check hypothesis would suggest that more
representatives on this committee could secure more funding for their states. The
committee members potentially change biennially, supplying four periods of different
committee compositions over this study’s time period of focus. California has frequent
and massive fires and had anywhere from 5 to 11 representatives sitting on this
committee over the analysis period, whereas Indiana has relatively few (and small) fires
and had no representatives on this committee. Representatives from states with more
wildfires may have stronger incentives to request and be appointed by their party’s
leadership to seats on that committee so as to influence funding allocations.
The total land area of a state may affect the costs of fighting wildfires because
larger states may find it harder to mobilize resources to suppress fires than geographically
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smaller state. Area measurements are in square miles and are taken from U.S. Census
Bureau reports.
Binary variables are entered for seven U.S. regions (i.e., regional fixed effects):
northeast, southeast, mountain west, California, central, southwest, and northwest. The
regional dummy variables control for otherwise unexplained geographic differences
impacting the USFS’s fire-suppression regime.2
I rely on Forest Service budgets to generate a binary variable for whether the
agency receives a budget increase. All Forest Service budgets come from budget
overviews and budget justifications. The Forest Service reports the most recent year’s
budget online, but for the earlier years in this dataset only U.S. Department of
Agriculture reports are available online. Those sources both should contain similar
numbers, although they most likely will not be exactly the same because of differences in
methodologies. I will be using both data sources despite potential inconsistencies because
they are the best data available to me.
Finally, I control for state per capita incomes because wealthier states likely have
more resources available locally for wildfire suppression. Wealthier states may have
more households located in WUIs, especially as second homes. All of the observations on
per capita incomes by state by year are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

2

Two additional regions, Alaska and Hawaii, were controlled for originally, but insufficient data were
available on those two states for inclusion in the final dataset. Although Alaska and Hawaii remain in the
data tables, none of the tests use their information.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable
Observations Mean
2.37e+07

Standard
Deviation
6.61e+07

Min.

Suppression
Expenditures (2015 $)

287

Cost per Acre of
Suppression
(2015 $)

285

336.822

1,347.701

0

20446.36

Number of Fires

305

1,426.102

1,979.672

1

16,614

Acres Burned

307

147,173.6

435,333

0

5,111,404

Palmer Drought Severity
Index

294

0.181

2.346

-5.75

7.38

Lightning Flashes

294

487,459.9

496,075.8

9018

4,071,174

Appropriations
Committee Members

308

0.834

1.276

0

Per Capita Income

294

41,237.14

6,027.134

Injuries

301

1.398

7.474

0

97

Deaths

301

0.159

1.260

0

19

Politicians

308

0.834

1.276

0

11

Land Area (Sq. Miles)

308

84,048.02

USFS Suppression
Budget
(2015 $)

308

7.75e+08

2.03e+08

5.10e+08

9.98e+08

Budget Increase (2015 $)

308

-1.97e+07

1.93e+08

-4.58e+08

1.70e+08

Budget Increase Binary

308

0.571

0.495

0

1

Budget Increase Next
Year Binary

307

0.713

0.452

0

1

99,769.1

0

Max.

28,884

9,349.16

5.53e+08

11

57,705

665,384

Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of my variables over the period of the
sample (FY 2009-2015).
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The models I test use a panel dataset of 42 states from 2009 to 2015. The first test
seeks to explain the determinants of the cost per acre of suppressing wildfires. After
running a standard OLS regression, I found evidence of heteroscedasticity. I use a
reiterative Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to account for this heteroscedasticity to
estimate:
y(Cost/Acres Burned) =𝛽(Suppression Expenditures) + 𝛽(Number of Fires)
+𝛽(Palmer Drought Severity Index) +𝛽(Population) + 𝛽(Injuries)
+𝛽(Deaths)+ 𝛽(Politicians) + 𝛽(Land Area) + 𝛽(Region) + 𝛽(Budget
Increase) +𝛽(Per Capita Income)

(i)

The second test seeks to explain the determinant of suppression expenditures. I
use a random effects model to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the states to
estimate:
(ii)

y(Suppression Expenditures) = 𝛽(Acres Burned) + 𝛽(Acres Burned Last
Period) + 𝛽(Suppression Expenditures Last Period) + 𝛽(Number of Fires)
+𝛽(Lightning Flashes) + 𝛽(Palmer Drought Severity Index) + 𝛽(Population)
+ 𝛽(Injuries) + 𝛽(Deaths) + 𝛽(Injuries Last Period) + 𝛽(Deaths Last Period)
+ 𝛽(Politicians) + 𝛽(Land Area) + 𝛽(Region) + 𝛽(Region*Acres Burned) +
𝛽(Per Capita Income)

The final test estimates a probit model seeking to explain the factors that increase
the probability of Forest Service budget increases:
(iii)

y(Probability of a Budget Increase Next Year) =𝛽(Suppression Expenditures)
+ 𝛽(Suppression Expenditures 2 ) + 𝛽(Acres Burned) + 𝛽(Lightning Flashes)
+ 𝛽(Palmer Drought Severity Index) + 𝛽(Population) +𝛽(Injuries)
+𝛽(Deaths) + 𝛽(Politicians) + 𝛽(Land Area) + 𝛽(Region)
+𝛽(Region*Acres Burned) +𝛽(Per Capita Income)
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Table 2
Regression Output Summary
(i) Cost per
Acre

Suppression
Expenditures

1.41e-07
(3.00e-06)

Suppression
Expenditures
Last Period
Number of Fires

(ii) Suppression
Expenditures

(iii) Probability of a
Budget Increase

-1.48e-08
(1.24e-08)
0.140
(0.032)***

-0.1685141
(0.0972761)*

807.972
(1109.349)

Acres Burned

372.580
(28.593)***

Acres Burned
Last Period

13.776
(6.559)**

0.0000199
(0.0017968)

Palmer Drought
Severity Index

3.955566
(58.11045)

-2,032,992
(653,408.6)***

-0.099361
(0.0481496)**

Population

-0.0000212
(0.0000368)

-0.335
(0.416)

1.59e-08
(2.73e-08)

Injuries

-11.51143
(20.96077)

647,225.5
(280,764.9)**

-0.0046924
(0.0445119)

Injuries Last
Period
Deaths

-778,323.3
(233,257.8)***
9.623928
(73.64988)

Deaths Last
Period
Appropriations
Committee
Members

1,201,302
(1,016,825)

0.4372841
(0.5403693)

-348.578.4
(973,013)
17.3514
(156.5624)

4,269,929
(1,794,452)**

-0.0549231
(0.1268221)
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Table Continues
Land Area

0.0039467
(0.0044714)

-26.655
(59.987)

4.22e-06
(4.19e-06)

Per Capita
Income

-0.0207793
(0.0243824)

-482.323
(248.572)*

-0.0000328
(0.0000175)*

Budget Increase

-1.90e-07
(5.55e-07)

Obs.
Adj. R2

n=234
-0.0434

n=270
0.9255

n=277
Pseudo R2=0.1030

F-Stat
Prob > F

0.38
0.9862

Wald chi2=3020.27
Prob>chi2=0.0000***

LR chi2=34.47
Prob>chi2=0.0440**

Model (ii) was tested for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test, which
generated high Chi-squared values. The model was re-estimated by a reiterative
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The first regression does not provide adequate evidence to support the hypothesis
that increasing suppression expenditures increases the cost per acre of suppressing
wildfires. The only statistically significant variable explaining the cost per acre of
suppressing wildfires is the total number of fires. According to this model, each
additional declared wildfire is associated with a $0.17 reduction in the cost per acre of
suppression. One potential explanation is that additional fires can make use of the same
resources, which reduces the cost of suppressing them (i.e., fire suppression efforts are
subject to economies of scale). Many of these fires may be suppressed with the same
efforts, but this result ultimately tells us little about the institutional blank-check
hypothesis. The negative adjusted R-squared (-0.0434) suggests that this model is not
explaining almost anything that affects the cost per acre of wildfire suppression.
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The second model appears to be much more robust with a substantially larger
adjusted R-squared (0.9255). This model provides much more compelling evidence
supporting the hypothesis. Relevant explanatory variables that are statistically significant
include suppression expenditures from the previous year, acres burned, acres burned from
the previous year, PDSI, injuries from wildfires, injuries from wildfires last year, the
number of politicians sitting on the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee,
and state per capita income. For this model, explanatory variables try to explain the total
suppression expenditures for a given state. The coefficient on PDSI (-$2,032,992) is
intuitive: drier climates produce more wildfires and, hence, greater suppression efforts.
Holding the other variables constant, each additional point on the PDSI scale, indicating
wetter conditions, is associated with $2,032,992 less in suppression expenditures.
More interesting in this second model are the variables suggesting political
influences on wildfire suppression funding. Each additional dollar spent on fire
suppression in the past time period is associated with about $0.14 more in suppression
expenditures in the current time period holding other explanatory variables constant. This
provides some evidence to support the institutional blank-check, whereby spending more
in one time period is likely to be associated with spending more the next time period.
Acres burned in both the current and past time period are significantly and positively
associated with suppression expenditures. Injuries in the current time period are
positively and significantly associated with higher suppression expenditures, with each
additional injury associated with about $647,000 more in suppression expenditures.
Injuries likely promote a political response that elicits more demand for wildfire
suppression, although injuries may also reflect the severity of a wildfire. Interestingly,
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injuries in the past time period are significant and negatively associated with suppression
expenditures. This suggests that an injury in the previous fire season is associated with
spending $778,000 less on fire suppression holding other explanatory variables constant.
One potential explanation could be that fire managers are less likely to aggressively fight
fires if they think this strategy could jeopardize firefighters’ lives.
The coefficient on the number of representatives who sit on the House Natural
Resources Appropriations Committee is also positive and significantly associated with
suppression expenditures. The results from this test suggest that each additional
appropriations committee member is associated with about $4.3 million more in fire
suppression, holding other explanatory variables constant. This marginal effect of a state
having a representative on the Appropriations Committee strongly suggests political
motives behind fire suppression.
The coefficient on per capita income is significant at the 10 percent level in this
model, but the coefficient is negative. This may suggest that wealthier states are less
likely to spend more on fire suppression, although this may also reflect differences in
where wealthier households live.
The final probit regression does not provide adequate evidence to support the
hypothesis. The only statistically significant explanatory variables are the PDSI and per
capita income. The model fails to provide enough evidence to suggest that larger
suppression expenditures will increase the probability of the Forest Service receiving a
larger budget the following year. Interestingly, per capita income is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level with a negative coefficient (-0.0000328). Although the

25
coefficient is very small, this finding suggests that states with higher per capita incomes
actually have a smaller probability of increasing Forest Service budgets.
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DISCUSSION

The results of these regression analyses provide some evidence to support the
hypothesis that politics drives wildfire suppression efforts. The strongest finding suggests
that, holding acres burned, drought conditions, number of fires, and other control
variables constant, a state with more representatives sitting on the House Committee of
Natural Resources is associated with higher levels of spending on wildfire suppression.
These politicians face public pressures to protect their constituents’ private property
using federal funding regardless of cost, which raises the cost of managing wildfires.
Emphasizing wildfire suppression regardless of cost creates an indirect subsidy
for property owners living in the WUI. The subsidy promotes moral hazard by
encouraging more development in at-risk areas, which leads to more need for costly and
inefficient suppression. Local communities that are in charge of zoning are not
incentivized to discourage development in at-risk areas, and instead allow development to
collect the increased revenues knowing they do not need to pay the cost of protecting
these properties. A disproportionate number of homes built in these areas are actually
second-homes, suggesting that this is not only an indirect subsidy to property owners, but
an indirect subsidy to wealthy property owners who can likely afford the cost of insuring
their homes for wildfire risks (Headwaters Economics, 2009). This subsidy is likely
driving up the cost of suppressing wildfires, as the Forest Service spends more each year
on protecting these properties.
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If the cost were shifted to the local communities and people living in at-risk areas,
there would be more incentive to construct homes in a way to minimize the risk of
damage from wildfires. Because land use planning is a local government responsibility
and the cost of defending homes is a state and federal burden, local governments tend to
allow development in risky areas and promote moral hazard. These local communities
keep the revenues from development without paying the cost to protect these
developments.
One option to reduce wildfire suppression expenditures is to create more fire
adapted communities. Property owners can develop the WUI with minimal risk of
wildfire damage by implementing certain practices. The USFS’s FIREWISE program
provides guidelines for how to minimize this risk, but only some two percent of the
70,000 at-risk communities undergo this certification (Rasker, 2015). Further, wildfire
risk is not fully assessed by insurance companies, which have inspected less than three
percent of the 46 million at-risk homes for wildfire survivability.
Although USFS employees have the best intentions, the bureaucracy’s
institutional realities have been driving bad outcomes in wildfire management in the
United States. Fire managers can be disciplined and even fired for escaped prescribed
fires or wildland fire use, but there is virtually no risk of losing a job by overspending on
fire suppression. When combined with regulatory burdens to proactive management,
including provisions of the Clean Air Act that discourage prescribed burning, fire
managers find it much easier to suppress a fire than to manage a forest to prevent future
fires (Weisz, n.d.). Knowing that there are minimal budget constraints to fire suppression,
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most fire managers face an incentive to spend exorbitantly on fire suppression to create a
political show of public benefits. These political shows and public benefits create an
image of the USFS as protector of the forest and human life and property, which
maintains public support for the agency. As far as congressional funding goes, when
managers have a good fire season they can point to their successes and request similar
levels of funding the following year. When managers have a bad fire season, they can
argue they did not have enough funding and request additional funding. Wildfire
suppression budgets keep increasing, but there is never any check on USFS power to
make sure these budget increases are actually effective.
Fire managers are risk averse towards prescribed fires, one of the most effective
methods for proactively mitigating wildfire risk (Maguire and Albright, 2005). Mental
shortcuts tend to bias fire management decision-making towards risk aversion. For
example, because prescribed fires have the potential to escape and become wildland fires,
fire managers often abide by a precautionary principle, preferring the certainty of “no
fire” to an alternative risk of escaped fires on the manager’s watch.
Although risk aversion plagues all fire managers, government is particularly bad
at responding to disasters like wildfires. Government fails to adequately handle disaster
relief for three primary reasons (Shughart, 2006). First, politicians and bureaucrats are
incentivized to make decisions with highly visible results that they can take credit for, so
government officials tend to under-prepare for emergencies instead focusing on postdisaster response. Second, each level of government tries to control the one below it by
imposing detailed rules to restrict discretionary authority. Fire managers on the ground
who know what needs to be done are often separated by multiple levels of bureaucracy
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from the decision makers. Finally, government disaster relief is subject to high levels of
corruption and bureaucratic waste because of a general lack of oversight and
accountability.
Responding to a wildfire is ultimately a question of how best to allocate resources
to where they are needed most. Central authorities are inefficient at finding ways to
mobilize firefighters, aircraft, shelters, and other resources needed during a severe
wildfire. The solution to this problem is to utilize dispersed knowledge, allowing
individual actors to coordinate with each other through pricing mechanisms (Hayek,
1945). Without price distortions from government control, insurance companies,
firefighting groups, residential developments, and all forms of disaster relief could find
an optimal supply of their goods and services to mitigate the risk of wildfires, as well as
respond to them appropriately.
Past fire suppression and fuel buildup from declining timber harvest from
environmental policies like the Endangered Species Act makes current fire management
more expensive and dangerous. But after decades of supposed fuels management, one
would expect forests are becoming less dangerous to manage. The USFS still struggles to
proactively manage fires because the agency has always focused more on suppression
than reducing fuel buildup. Even if the agency did consistently manage a few million
acres each year to reduce fuel buildup, the tens of millions of acres managed by the USFS
would never have all of its fuel buildup removed.
Smokey Bear’s adage “Only you can prevent wildfires” is a naive reflection of a
widespread belief that we can control a natural phenomenon. Wildfires, just like
tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, and flash floods, have existed since before written
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history, and will long outlast any person. Wildfires are unique, however, in that they are
not solely the result of atmospheric conditions, but have also been started and managed
by humans. Rather than try to abolish all wildfires, we have the tools to manage them for
resource benefits and minimize the damages inflicted from wildfires. By reforming the
institutions, incentives, and regulatory burdens that fire managers and developers face,
the costs of managing and living with wildfires will fall and the severity of those
wildfires will likely follow.
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